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SALVAGE project
The purpose of the SALVAGE project is to develop better support for managing and designing a secure
future smart grid. This approach includes cyber security technologies dedicated to power grid operation
as well as support for the migration to the future smart grid solutions, including the legacy of ICT that
necessarily  will  be  part  of  it.  The  objective  is  further  to  develop  cyber  security  technology  and
methodology optimized with the particular needs and context of the power industry, something that is
to a large extent lacking in general cyber security best practices and technologies today. In particular
the  focus  of  the  project  will  be  on  smart  grid  with  many  small  distributed  energy  resources,  in
particular LV substation automation systems and LV distribution system. 
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1 Introduction
This report explores models already available at DTU and investigates modeling techniques usable for
model-based anomaly detection of a single power system component connected to the distribution grid
(consumer or producer). Section 2 identifies the model requirements for intrusion detection, including
the  introduction  to  the  SALVAGE  framework  and  the  working  scenario.  The  intrusion  detection
concept  from  computer  science  and  anomaly  detection  applied  to  physical  behavior  of  DERs  is
introduced  in  Section  3.  Section  4 discusses  DER modeling  for  the  purpose  of  the  model-based
intrusion detection and introduces models developed by DTU Electrical Engineering, Energy System
Operation and Management Group. Section 5 investigates different data-driven PV models usable for
model-based intrusion  detection  and discusses  data  cleaning,  modeling  techniques,  required  model
inputs, finally the available PV models are evaluated and compared. Section 6 introduces the proposed
method of anomaly based intrusion detection with use of physical PV model including data preparation
and  cleaning,  power  production  prediction,  residual  analysis  and  anomaly  evaluation.  Section  7
concludes  and  outlines  future  SALVAGE  research  in  the  area  of  the  cyber-physical  model-based
intrusion detection.
2 Model Requirements for Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) discern observable events reflected in available data and metrics into
information  about  possible  cyber-attacks.  In  physical  infrastructures,  computational  models  of  the
system’s behavior are often used for decision and control purposes, and are thus often readily available.
The idea of model-based cyber-physical intrusion detection aims to integrate such behavior models into
a framework for detection of external interference (with assumed malicious intent). 
In this section we identify what type of information and knowledge can be inferred from behavioral
representations of a system and how such models should be integrated support intrusion detection.
2.1  SALVAGE IDS framework
The SALVAGE project investigates cyber-physical vulnerabilities in the distribution network: cyber
vulnerability assessment, physical intrusion detection, power system vulnerability assessment, power
system impact of cyber-attacks. The overall requirements for the IDS framework in the context of the
SALVAGE project are motivated by the following observations:
 Cyber-attacks aimed at disrupting system operation may manifest themselves to the observer in
much the same way as system faults, such as normal component failures, : a successful cyber-
attack will cause the system behavior to deviate from a desired behavior.
 Cyber-attacks may be designed to cause system failure because that is the desired destructive
behavior or to simply emulate behaviors, for cloaking or detection avoidance; both strategies,
for example, have been employed in case of Stuxnet [4].
 The ability to correctly distinguish between failure and attack post-mortem is just as important
as the ability to prevent attacks in the first  place; a recognized and analyzed attack pattern
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enables prevention of attack repetition and elimination of attack vectors.
 The engineering effort available for develop accurate simulation models for an IDS facilitating
cyber-attack prevention at distribution level is large. Practical IDS development and operation
should therefore be largely independent of accurate physical model of the investigated physical
system.
The first  two observations motivate the use of behavioral models representing the expected cyber-
physical  system behavior  for  reference  and on-line detection;  the  latter  observations  however  also
encourage an engineering strategy for IDS development that integrates well with other engineering and
business  work flows and focuses on a  close interaction with available  data  sources  (a  data-driven
engineering approach).
A pure data-driven modeling itself cannot be sufficient to discriminate between the various types of
attack vectors. In addition to behavioral representations, also a qualitative framework is required to
hypothesize and evaluate alternative attack scenarios. 
In the SALVAGE framework, we therefore propose a two-layered approach as illustrated in Figure 1.
The  analysis  of  measurements  and  integration  of  cyber-physical   behavioral  models  aims  toward
anomaly detection; the interpretation of observed anomalies is then passed to another analysis layer
aimed at  intrusion detection, which integrates anomaly information with knowledge about expected
system behaviors (for example control signals,  current system configurations,  operating modes and
procedures).
Figure 1 Outline of SALVAGE Intrusion detection framework.
Behavioral models represent a previously observed and explained behavior; in case of cyber-physical
models, this behavior is typically the dynamic behavior of a physical system which is under some
control influence. This behavior can be employed serve as a normative reference (‘normal behavior’),
and in this way they may be employed as a normative reference for cross-validating measurements to
detect deviations from the modeled outputs as behavior anomalies. Whereas such models represent
physical and controlled system behavior well,  they contain no information about possible intrusion
pathways, thus they may only serve to detect behavior anomalies, but do not identify the ‘intent’ in the
behavior.
As part of the SALVAGE efforts, this report present the anomaly detection part of Work Package 2,
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Model-based intrusion detection, investigates intrusion detection methods based on the attack scenarios
outlined in WP1. The research and experimental work includes white and a black box model based on
measurements  and  physical  system state,  and  investigates  model-based  and  signal-based  intrusion
detection. The presented first part of WP2 work is an investigation of anomaly detection techniques for
distinguishing normal and suspicious operation, as described in this report. 
2.2   SALVAGE working scenario
As a development context for the SALVAGE techniques, a number of scenarios are developed in WP1.
We assume the proposed intrusion detection system to be situated within the SALVAGE distribution
network scenario outlined in [2]. The scenario considers a low voltage distribution grid, as presented in
Figure 2, with buildings and PVs connected to the transformer (Tr1). In this report we are focusing on
the independent components and representing them with models, therefore we are considering cyber-
security aspects of buildings and PVs.
Figure 3.The interactions between DER and Aggregator in the considered scenario [2].
The DER components considered in this  report can be externally controlled, for example from the
Aggregator. As shown in figure 3, the interaction (noted with red dot) refers to sending set-points from
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Figure 2: SALVAGE PowerCap scenario as presented in [2]
the Aggregator to the DER unit. The security of this interaction considers an intruder overwriting the
setting originating at the Aggregator or setting an independent set-point to the unit. 
3 Intrusion detection 
Intrusion detection system (IDS), in computer science, gathers and analyzes the information form the
computer network or system activities in order to discover malicious activities or violations of policy.
IDSs use one of two detection techniques:
 Statistical anomaly based IDS - where the anomalies are detected by comparing the system or the
network behavior with the established baseline behavior. The baseline behavior is referred to a
'normal'  behavior,  where the intrusion is  defined as  anomaly or  significantly different  than the
baseline.
 Signature-based IDS - where known intrusions or attacks are recorded or defined with a signature
and the network or the system behavior is compared to these signatures in order to find the match to
well-known malicious behavior and intrusions.
Anomaly based intrusion detection is explored for malicious control of DER in power system. The
complex  physical  behavior  of  the  unit  ('normal'  behavior)  is  obtained  from the  DER model  and
compared to the observed behavior in order to detect anomalies. This way the IDS can divide the
observed  behavior  of  the  unit  into  'normal'  and  'suspicious'.  In  order  to  detect  the  reason  of  the
suspicious behavior, signature-based IDS can be used to detect for example device failures.
In the WP2 of the SALVAGE project we first consider anomaly detection with use of DER models and
continue  to  signature-based  intrusion  detection  to  explore  the  reason  for  anomaly,  focusing  on
distinguishing between verified and malicious control. This report describes the model-based intrusion
detection technique of a single DER connected to the distribution grid.
3.1  Anomaly detection applied to physical behavior models
In order to verify if the unit is being controlled by an unauthorized entity, its behavior can be observed
and classified into four categories: 
 normal operation- when the unit behaves as expected and it is not controlled by any external set-
point,
 faulty operation – when the unit's operation is distorted by a fault on the unit or in its electrical
network environment,
 verified control – when unit behaves as expected under a verified control scheme, or according to
issued set-points,
 malicious control – the unit is operated with unverified control scheme or unauthorized set-points.
The prosed categorization of the unit behavior can be included in process of detecting an intrusion
affecting the operation of a DER. In order to discover anomalous behavior of the system, the ‘normal’
behavior needs to be described. When detecting anomalies in behavior of a DER, for example their
power production or consumption, its physical model can be used to define their ‘normal’ behavior. 
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Figure 4. Anomaly detection based on physical behavior models.
The proposed IDS uses anomaly detection method where the model output and the measurement data is
compared and their difference is analyzed, as presented in Figure 4. In order to perform the anomaly
detection  the normal  behavior  of  the DER need to  be  defined as  a  DER model,  this  model  takes
measurements and DER state and outputs data associated with the normal behavior (for example an
active power value of a power producer). The difference between the normal and observed behavior is
weighted in order to detect anomalies. Next anomalies are evaluated and the IDS outputs a report about
discovered anomalies.
4 DER Modeling
This report investigates the anomaly-based intrusion detection with use of model applied to individual
power system components: DERs. DER models need to be for the proposed anomaly-based intrusion
detection. This chapter presents  selected DER models developed by DTU Electrical Engineering at
Energy Systems Operation and Management Group. The existing models are described, categorized
and  evaluated  by  Evaluate  types  by,  complexity  of  modeling  tasks,  behavior  modes,  available
redundant input,  relevance and impact for grid, and use for the selected SALVAGE scenario.  Data
driven modeling is presented in this section and its advantages and disadvantages are highlighted.
4.1   Discussion of Existing Models 
Appendix 1 presents a list of selected power system components and grid models existing in SYSLAB
laboratory.  The model list and characteristics are included in  Appendix 1. Types of modeled units
presented in Table 5 in Appendix 1 are as follows:
 PV - photovoltaic array
 Battery
 Grid - subset of a distribution grid
 House - heating system or the building thermal model
 Fridge
 Washing machine
 Microwave
The presented models are evaluated in  several aspects, relevant to the SALVAGE project:
 Complexity of modeling tasks – how complex is the component model, what is the effort to
create an individual model and a set of models representing the same DER type
 Behavior modes – ability of the model to recognize different types of behavior, for example
normal behavior of an occupied or unoccupied house.
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 Available redundant input – does the model uses redundant data in order to eliminate the
anomalies created by faulty sensor readings  
 Relevance and impact on the distribution grid – how large is the impact of the malicious
control or behavior of the modeled unit
 Use for scenario – does the modeled unit appear in one of the SALVAGE scenarios.
Table 1 presents the evaluation of models presented in Appendix 1 and presents the basis for the final
model selection.
Table 1. Evaluation of existing DER models.
DER type
Evaluation
PV Battery Grid House Fridge Washing 
machine
Microwave
Complexity of 
modeling tasks
Complex Complex Complex Complex Simple Simple Simple 
Behavior modes No No No No No No No 
Available 
redundant input
No No No No No No No 
Relevance and 
impact on the 
distribution grid
Relevant Relevant Very 
relevant
Relevant Low impact Low impact Low impact 
Use for scenario Scenario 1 Not 
considered
Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Not 
considered
Not 
considered
Not 
considered
Based on the evaluation presented in  Table 1, models of PV, battery,  grid and house are the most
relevant models, considering the impact of the malicious operation on the distribution grid. Only PV,
grid  and  house  models  are  relevant  for  the  SALVAGE Scenario  1.  This  report  considers  DERs,
therefore the focus can be put on a PV or a house model. The PV model was chosen for the first testing
of  intrusion  detection  system,  as  its  operation  only  depends  on  the  environmental  conditions  and
external control signals. The house is a much more complicated case as it also includes the human
interaction that is not easily modeled and predicted.
The existing physical models of the laboratory PV actually refer just to one PV in SYSLAB laboratory
(see [5] and section 5), out of three. This PV was carefully measured and identified in order to create
very accurate model, used for PV use optimization. The existing PV model cannot be reused for other
PVs in the SYSLAB laboratory. A large modeling effort is required to obtain models for all available
PVs in SYSLAB. Since the IDS should be applied to a large number of PVs, accurate models might not
exist for all intended PVs. In this project we investigate the use of data driven methods and machine
learning to determine the PV model based on the observed historical data.
4.2 Data driven modeling 
Data driven modeling refers to modeling efforts based on historical observations of the considered
system. This type of modeling can be used for black-box modeling, where only input and output of the
system is observable, and the internal workings are unknown. Data-driven modeling is common in data
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mining and machine learning. Machine learning is a method of programming computers to act in a way
that  have  not  been  explicitly  programmed.  Data  mining  is  a  computational  process  aiming  at
discovering patterns in data.
The advantage of using data driven modeling is its flexibility: this computational method can identify
the  observed  unit  without  a  prior  knowledge  of  its  inner  workings.  Models  can  be  created  from
historical  observations  of  any  system.  Even  unknown  patters  and  complex  phenomena  can  be
discovered in the data and expressed in the model. Model can be calculate automatically and updated if
the system behavior changes. Disadvantages include large computation effort to generate the model, the
model  quality  depends  on  the  data  quality  and  generality  of  the  model  depends  on  the  statistical
properties of the data and the data size.
5 PV modeling
This section presents PV modeling efforts with data driven approaches. Section  5.1 presents the PV
modeling strategy used for all presented models, including data cleaning, aggregation, selection and
pre-processing. Next four regression models (linear or polynomial) based on meteorological data are
presented in section 5.2. Sections 5.3 and  present two artificial neural network models for the same PV
in SYSLAB: meteorological model and neighborhood model. The presented models are validated and
compared in Section 5.5.
Figure 5. SYSLAB laboratory at DTU Risø Campus.
SYSLAB  [5] is a research facility for intelligent, active and distributed power systems at Technical
University in Denmark, Risø Campus, as presented in Figure 5. SYSLAB enables research and testing
of control concepts and strategies for power systems with distributed control and integrating a number
of decentralized production and consumption components including wind turbines and PV plant in a
systems context. SYSLAB consists of three interconnected sites. It includes two wind turbines (11kW
and  55kW),  a  PV plants  (7  kW,  10kW,  10kW),  a  diesel  generation  set  (48  kW /  60  kVA),  the
PowerFlexHouse Complex (3 houses of 20kW), a 15 kW / 120 kWh vanadium redox flow battery, and
a  number  of  loads  (75  kW,  3  x  36  kW).  They  are  all  connected  in  one  distributed  control  and
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measurement system that enables very flexible setup with respect to experimental configuration.  It
allows grid connected operation, island operation, or operation in parallel with wind turbine or PV
plant. 
In order  to create models in this  section data  form meteorological  station,  and three PVs: PV117,
PV319, PV715, asp resented in section 5.2.
5.1   PV modeling strategy
The raw data from the laboratory need to be prepared before it can be used for modeling. The stages of
the chosen data driven model development are presented in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Developed data driven modeling strategy for ANN models.
The data cleaning, preparation and pre-processing stages are as follows:
1. Data cleaning: There can be many errors appearing in the raw sensor data. The process of cleaning
the data starts form filling missing time series with NA values, so all time-series for a day consist of
exactly 86400 data points. The next step is discovering if the time-series have unexpected values.
The threshold between realistic and unrealistic values can be determined manually. For example
temperature of 50°C is unrealistic for Danish outdoor temperature and can be discarded. Unrealistic
values are replaced with NA. If the number of unrealistic values is large the sensor might have been
broken. In this case we use signal processing to remove the noise form the data and replace it with
NA.
2. Aggregation: Once the data is clean and uniform size it can be aggregated. One second values are
aggregated to 1 minute values, reducing the size of time-series to 1440 samples. This process is
performed  in  order  to  save  processing  time  for  model  creation,  while  not  losing  much  of
information. The aggregation is done omitting NA and with mean value for samples.
3. Correlation analysis: The correlation of model output and input is calculated. If the correlation is
very small (correlation<0.2) the entire day is removed from the data. This step eliminates data with
standard deviation equal to zero (which in unrealistic for sensor data) which are periods with a long
sensor failures. The statistical significance is not considered here.
4. Model  data  selection:  The days  secreted  by  the  previous  step  have  been used  for  the  model
creation. The timestamps are removed and data samples are grouped in vectors, where sample I is
as follows:           iini2i1i output,input,,input,input=sample ... . 
5. Omit NA:  All samples where at least one value in the vector  isample is equal to NA are omitted,
as used modeling method, ANN, does not accept vectors with NA values. The set of observations
     k21 sample,,sample,sample=S ... is divided into three groups of random samples:  training set
TS , cross-validation set CVS , and validation set VS , so that VCVT SSS=S  . 
6. Normalization:  Vector  normalization is  usually  performed before ANN model  fitting.  Samples
from TS have been normalized.
7. Model  creation:  The  model  was  created  using  one  of  two  ANN  libraries  for  R  (nnet and
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neuralnet) with parameters adjusted to fit the training data. 
The following sections present simple linear and polynomial regression meteorological models (section
5.2),  ANN  meteorological  model  is  described  in  section  5.3,  and  section  5.4 presents  ANN
neighborhood model, all predicting active power output of a PV. All models are trained in the same set
of 1 second time-series data, power production of PVs in SYSLAB laboratory and meteorological data
from October 2014. The data used to train models from the following sections is 1 minute time-series
consisting of 44640 rows, randomly divided into 3 sets: VCVT S,S,S of size 14841, 14901, and 14898
accordingly.
5.2 Regression meteorological model
Several simple linear regression models were created to predict the active power production of the
considered PV. Presented meteorological models take solar irradiation, wind speed, wind direction and
ambient temperature and output the expected power production in kW, as presented in  Figure 7.
Basic R library lm was used to create linear and polynomial models from input data. In this section we
preset five models and compare them.
Proposed hypothesis 321 h,h,h,h0  for construction of five models 321 M,M,M,M 0  are as follows:
Parameters for each hypothesis        321 θ,θ,θ,θ 0 were calculated with use of training set TS  of 14841
samples (out of 44640 samples form the S set) with use of lm function in R.
5.2.1 Regression model-0
Takes irradiation to calculate the power consumption with formula as follows:   
       Irrθ+θ=θh 111010 , where  0θ =( 0.1094376   2.2604230 )
Figure 8 shows the linear, single variable model for the PV production, data points are model input data
form set  TS  and the power calculated form this  set.  Figure 9 presents the model prediction (red)
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Figure 7. Simple regression PV model graphical representation.
compared to the real production data (black) form set CVS . It is visible that the model is not very
accurate in minimums and maximums of the production, therefore a simple model cannot be used for
the intrusion detection purposes.
Figure 8. Model-0 training data and model output.
Figure 9. Model-0 output compared to the measured PV117 production.
5.2.2 Regression model-1
Takes irradiation, wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature to calculate the power consumption
with formula as follows:
            Tempθ+Wdθ+Wsθ+Irrθ+θ=θh 141312111011 ,  where   1θ =(  0.0152916763304,  2.6721188099024,
0.0689680031581,-0.0001766575963, 0.0014208500330 )
Figure 11 shows the linear model for the PV production, data points are model input data form set TS
and the power calculated form this set. 
Figure 11  presents the model prediction (red) compared to the real production data (black) form set
CVS . In comparison to the output for Model-0 (Figure 9), model-1 predicts better in the minimums,
and performs slight better in maximums.
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Figure 11. Model-1 training input and output data.
5.2.3 Regression model-2
This linear model takes irradiation, wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature to calculate the
power consumption with formula as follows:   
                     228272262252423222120 Tempθ+Wθ+Wsθ+Irrθ+Tempθ+Wdθ+Wsθ+Irrθ+θ=θh 222 , where 
 2θ =  (-0.990668284934828,   6.070479844300378,   0.110911311188601,  -0.003277889451628,
0.166264220499390,  -4.012042544422539,  -0.006648793318575  ,  0.000006192536912,
-0.006105482360976 )
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Figure 10. Model-1 PV power prediction results (red) obtained with the cross-validation data set.
Figure 12. Model-2 graphical representation on the training data.
Relations  between  polynomial  model  presented  in  this  section  and  the  training  input  data  TS  is
presented in the Figure 12. The parabolic shape of the power prediction mapped to the irradiation, does
not reflect the strong correlation between the data, and therefore suggests that the power production
maximums will be decreased in the model.
Wind  direction  and  temperature  are  better  mapped  by  the  model  to  the  power  production,  in
comparison to  model-0 (Figure  8)  and model-1  (Figure  11),  improving the  power  prediction  only
slightly, as shown in .
5.2.4 Regression model-3
This model takes irradiation, wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature to calculate the power
consumption with formula as follows:   
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Figure 13. Model-2 PV power prediction results (red) obtained with the cross-validation data set.
                       3392382372362353433323130 Irrθ+Tempθ+Wdθ+Wsθ+Irrθ+Tempθ+Wdθ+Wsθ+Irrθ+θ=θh 33
      33
12
33
11
33
10 Tempθ+Wdθ+Wsθ+ ,where   3θ = (8.815803e-01,  5.244864e+00,  6.418637e-01,
-1.302377e-03,   -3.323558e-01,    6.125233e-02,   -1.589988e-01,   -9.234099e-06,    2.597408e-02,
-4.634485e+00,   1.249784e-02,   3.622099e-08,  -6.469007e-04).
The model input (black) and output for irradiation, wind speed, wind direction and ambient temperature
is presented in  Figure 14. In comparison with model-2 (Figure 12), model-3 behaves similarly; also
inheriting the problem with predicting maximums of the power production, see Figure 15.
The additional variables do not improve the model-1 in comparison to model-2 (Figure 12). A nonlinear
model should be explored to improve the prediction.
Figure 14. Model-3 graphical representation on the training data.
Figure 15. Model-3 PV power prediction results (red) obtained with the cross-validation data set.
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-----Pages 16-25 not available-----
Pages 17-26 contain results that are part of a scientific publication that is currently under review, these 
pages will be available after March 2016. In case of questions, please contact the corresponding author 
Anna Magdalena Kosek at amko@elektro.dtu.dk.
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7 Conclusions and future work
This report presents model requirements for intrusion detection (section  2) including the SALVAGE
IDS framework (section 2.1) and a short description the considered SALVAGE scenario (section 2.2).
Anomaly based intrusion detection method applied to  physical  behavior  of  a  DER is  presented in
section 3. The discussion about the existing PV operation models and approached to PV modeling are
presented in sections 4and 5. Data driven models using linear and polynomial regression and artificial
neural  networks  with  different  inputs  are  presented  in  sections  5.2-5.4,  the  presented  models  are
compared  and  evaluated  in  section  5.5.  The  proposed  model-based  intrusion  detection  system  is
presented in section 6, and applied to anomaly detection and evaluation of a PV operation with use of
presented ANN models.
The future work includes further investigation into formal definition of normal behavior of a PV array,
residual  analysis  and anomaly evaluation.  Next  signature-based intrusion  detection  can  be  used to
distinguish control action performed on a PV with use of data from SYSLAB laboratory. 
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Table 5. List of selected DER models.
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